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FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
The Fourth Circuit Summary, published at least once each year,
provides synopses of important recent environmental decisions decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The summary
does not cover every environmental decision of the Fourth Circuit, but
only those cases that the editors believe to be of the most interest to
subscribers.
CLEAN WATER ACT
American Canoe Association v. Murphy Farms, 210 F.3d 360 (4th Cir.
2000)
A coalition of conservation groups brought a citizen suit against a
sow farm in North Carolina that was operated under a North Carolina
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Animal
Waste Management Plan. Although the plan prohibited any animal-waste
discharges to surface waters, discharges from the farm had twice reached a
nearby creek as a result of runoff from fertilizing farm fields with the
animal waste. The owner, D.M. Farms (the Farms), had not applied for a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for the
farm. DENR did not require the Farms to apply for an NPDES permit, as
their position was that an entity could correct the discharge problem and
pay fines in lieu of applying, which the Farms had done.
Plaintiffs claimed first that the Farms continuously violated the
Clean Water Act (CWA) by failing to obtain an NPDES permit after
making the unauthorized discharges, and secondly that it violated the
CWA each time it discharged without an NPDES permit. Plaintiffs filed a
motion for partial summary judgment on the latter claim, and filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit the facility's operation. The
Farms filed a motion to dismiss the first claim, arguing that DENR did not
require it to obtain a permit. The federal district court for North Carolina's
eastern district denied the Farms' motion and granted both plaintiffs'
motions. Meanwhile, DENR had changed its policy regarding issuance of
NPDES permits to include facilities like plaintiffs' after this litigation was
commenced.
After the Farms applied to DENR for an NPDES permit and were
issued a draft permit, they appealed the district court's decision to the
Fourth Circuit, which determined that its review was limited to the order
granting a preliminary injunction because the appeal was interlocutory.
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The court declined to consider the summary judgment motion, as it was
not intimately bound up with preliminary injunction issues. Since the state
program now required an NPDES permit irrespective of the court's
resolution, the Fourth Circuit found that there was a reasonable likelihood
of mootness, and so remanded the preliminary injunction issues to the
district court to evaluate the claims.
Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149
(4th Cir. 2000)
Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Citizens Local Action
Environmental Network (CLEAN) brought a citizen suit alleging that
Gaston Copper Recycling Corporation (Gaston) had been illegally
discharging pollutants into a South Carolina waterway in violation of
Clean Water Act § 505, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as
well as civil penalties and costs. Members of FOE testified that the
discharges caused them to reduce their use of the Edisto River and its
tributaries; one member of CLEAN who owned a lake four miles
downstream from Gaston's facility alleged that the threat of pollution had
adversely affected his and his family's use and enjoyment of the lake. The
district court dismissed the case as to both plaintiffs, holding that they
lacked representational standing because none of their members had
demonstrated injury in fact that was fairly traceable to Gaston's alleged
permit violations, and the groups had not presented evidence concerning
chemical effects of Gaston's discharges in the waterways.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that the trial court had
erected "evidentiary barriers to standing that the Constitution does not
require and Congress has not embraced." 204 F.3d at 156. A well-known
aim of the CWA, the court said, is to ensure that the nation's waterways
are fishable and swimmable, and those health and recreational interests are
constitutionally recognized as cognizable bases for injury in fact. The lake
owner's harms were not hypothetical, since he was acting to protect a
threatened concrete interest of his own. The court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.,
528 U.S. 167 (2000), had not required evidence of actual harm to a
waterway, but had accepted citizen affidavits attesting to reduced use of a
waterway out of reasonable fear and concern of pollution. As a result, the
court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for a
determination of whether Gaston had discharged pollutants in excess of its
permit limits.
[Vol. 25:837
FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
U.S. v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 50 ERC (BNA) 1459, 30 ELR 20508 (4th
Cir. 2000)
James Deaton contracted to buy a twelve-acre parcel of land in
Wicomico County, Maryland, subject to its suitability for residential
development. After the county health department denied Deaton's
application for a sewage-disposal permit for a five-lot subdivision, he was
told by a Soil Conservation Service representative that the site's problems
could be corrected by digging a ditch through the middle of the property.
After Deaton purchased the land in 1989, an SCS District Conservationist
who had inspected the site told Deaton that, because much of the site
contained nontidal wetlands, he would need a permit from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) before undertaking any ditching projects.
Ignoring this advice, Deaton hired a contractor who used heavy machinery
to dig a 12,400-foot drainage ditch that intersected the areas that had been
identified as wetlands. The contractor piled the excavated dirt on either
side of the ditch, a practice known as sidecasting.
In 1990, after a Corps ecologist inspected the site, the Corps issued
stop-work orders to Deaton and his contractor, warning them that the
placement of fill material in a nontidal wetland violated § 404 of the Clean
Water Act (CWA). Over the next few years, Deaton made incomplete
attempts to file a joint state and federal application and engaged
consultants to negotiate with the Corps and prepare a remediation plan.
No remediation took place, however, and in 1995 the government filed a
civil complaint alleging that Deaton had violated the CWA. Upon
motions from both sides for summary judgment, the federal district court
for Maryland granted the government's motion for partial summary
judgment in September, 1997, holding that any wetlands on the property
were subject to the CWA and that sidecasting excavated material into
those wetlands was the discharge of a pollutant under that Act.
Two months later a panel of the Fourth Circuit decided US. v.
Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997), which included the question of
whether sidecasting in a wetland without a permit violated the CWA. The
panel split three ways on the issue, with one judge concluding that
sidecasting did not constitute discharge of a pollutant under the Act,
another judge concluding that it did, and the third judge concurring in the
judgment without reaching the sidecasting question. After Wilson was
decided, the district court vacated its award of partial summary judgment
to the United States, predicting that the Fourth Circuit would adopt the
reasoning of the judge who concluded that sidecasting is not the discharge
of a pollutant. The government appealed the judgment.
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The Fourth Circuit holding, contrary to the district court's
prediction, was that sidecasting constitutes discharge of a pollutant under
the CWA. The court reviewed the definitions in the CWA of "discharge
of a pollutant," which is defined as "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source," and "pollutant," which
specifically includes "dredged spoil" that has been "discharged into
water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) and § 1362(6). According to the court,
the dirt dredged up by Deaton's contractor unquestionably constituted
pollutants under these definitions. The more difficult issue, however, was
what it means to discharge a pollutant into the waters of the United States.
Counsel for Deaton argued that the statutory definition of
discharge as an "addition of any pollutant" meant the addition of
something not previously present, which should not apply to sidecasting as
there was no introduction of new material into the area and no net increase
in the amount of material present in the wetland. The court found this
unconvincing, and noted that the activity of digging a ditch transformed
some material from a nonpollutant into a pollutant. "What is important is
that once that material was excavated from the wetland, its redeposit in
that same wetland added a pollutant where none had been before." 209
F.3d at 335-36. The court noted also that apparently harmless materials
like rock, sand, cellar dirt, and biological materials are specifically
designated as pollutants under CWA § 1362(6), and that nearly every
circuit court that had considered the meaning of the word "addition" had
come to the same conclusion as the Fourth Circuit did in this case.
CLEAN AIR ACT
New Pulaski Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
217 F.3d 840 (4th Cir. 2000)
The New Pulaski Company Limited Partnership (Pulaski) had
operated an incinerator for the City of Baltimore (the City) since 1981.
The incinerator, which was built in 1956, required substantial renovations
to comply with the federal Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, but
community opposition to the incinerator prompted the City Council to
enact an ordinance prohibiting construction, reconstruction, replacement,
or expansion of any incinerator in the City. Pulaski brought suit against
the Mayor and City Council, claiming the City's imposition of the
moratorium ordinance had prevented Pulaski from building a replacement
incinerator on its property in the City, and had thereby violated Pulaski's
fights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The case was first filed in state court, but was removed to federal
court as it had been brought mainly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The federal
district judge dismissed Pulaski's complaint on statute-of-limitation
grounds. On appeal, Pulaski argued that the three-year statute of
limitations on its takings claims was triggered when the City Council
failed to enact an ordinance exempting Pulaski from the moratorium,
rather than when the moratorium was passed. The court, however, held
that plaintiffs claim accrued upon the enactment of the moratorium, as
that was when the City interfered with Pulaski's use of its property in a
clear, concrete fashion. The court also found no tolling or justification for
equitable estoppel, and affirmed the lower court in finding that the claim
was time-barred.
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1081 (2001).
Plaintiffs, private landowners, and two North Carolina counties,
challenged the constitutionality of a Fish and Wildlife Service regulation
that limited the taking of red wolves on private land, and sought a
declaratory judgment that the anti-taking regulation of the Endangered
Species Act, 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c), as applied to the red wolves on private
land in eastern North Carolina, exceeded Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court upheld the
regulation as a valid exercise of federal power.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting its judicial duty to evaluate
whether a rational basis exists for concluding that a regulated activity
sufficiently affects interstate commerce, and observing that recent
Supreme Court cases had established that the commerce power contains
"judicially enforceable outer limits." U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 131 L.
Ed. 2d 626, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Under the Lopez framework, the
court found that the regulated activity substantially affected interstate
commerce as understood in broad terms, since "a cramped view of
commerce would cripple a foremost federal power and in so doing would
eviscerate national authority." 214 F.3d at 491. The taking of one red wolf
on private land might not be "substantial," but the takings of red wolves in
the aggregate have a sufficient impact on interstate commerce to uphold
the regulation.
One substantial effect on interstate commerce, the court found, was
tourism generated by the red wolves. Although the plaintiffs argued that
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the tourism rationale doesn't pertain to private land, the court held that so
many wolves wander onto private land that the regulation of takings on
private land is essential to the entire program of reintroduction and
restoration. In addition, the court found, the regulation of red wolf takings
is closely connected to the interstate market in scientific research, which
not only generates jobs but also deepens our knowledge of the world in
which we live. Finally, the court found that the taking of red wolves was
connected to interstate markets for agricultural products and livestock, and
that the takings restrictions' effect on commerce qualified as a legitimate
subject for regulation.
The court held that the regulation was sustainable as an integral
part of a comprehensive federal program for the protection of endangered
species and conservation of valuable wildlife resources, and that judicial
deference to the judgment of the democratic branches was therefore
appropriate.
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, Inc., v. Dalton, 217 F.3d 838 (4th
Cir. 2000)
A group of residents living near a naval air station in Virginia
challenged the adequacy of a Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
conducted by the U.S. Navy pursuant to the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 4321 et seq. The EIS identified alternative
scenarios for the reassignment of aircraft from another air station, and the
Navy selected an alternative that sent 156 aircraft to Naval Air Station
Oceana in Virginia Beach. The case came to the Fourth Circuit on appeal
after the federal district court for the eastern district of Virginia granted
summary judgment to the Navy.
Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise contended that the EIS
projected economic benefits for the community without assessing or
revealing reasonably foreseeable or known costs, particularly mitigation
costs for sound attenuation in private residences and schools as well as
property-value impacts. The Fourth Circuit found that it was not arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable for the Navy to exclude this information.
Since the Navy didn't have authority to spend federal funds on
improvements to state, local, or private property, it was not required to
provide specific estimates. The court also affirmed the sufficiency of the
Navy's cumulative-impact analysis, holding that it would be duplicative
[Vol. 25:837
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for the court to order a supplemental EIS since the Navy had itself
acknowledged that another EIS would be required in the future.
